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The current COVID-19 pandemic has called for 
unprecedented measures to contain it and, as such, has 
reinforced and produced complex and intertwining 
health and non-health inequalities. I take the perspective 
of relational egalitarianism and argue that these 
inequalities are not only issues of public health and 
economics but also of social justice. I thus aim to 
construct a relational egalitarian framework to examine 
how and why the inequalities of COVID-19 are unjust 
and to work out what structural changes and processes 
might be required to justly respond to these inequalities. 
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Inequality is our pre-existing condition. 
                                  – Paula Braveman1 
Outline and Significance of Topic 
The ongoing COVID-19 disease outbreak is an 
“unprecedented pandemic [that] calls for unprecedented   
measures to achieve its ultimate defeat.” 2  As such it has 
disproportionately affected groups of people and left them 
vulnerable in different yet overlapping ways.3 More precisely, 
it is a “syndemic” (a “synergistic epidemic”) that has 
reinforced and produced intertwining health and non-health 
inequalities.4 Granted, COVID-19 is not the only pandemic 
that can be associated with inequality. Ebola, HIV/AIDs, 
TB, and previous influenza outbreaks each revealed and 
worsened prevailing social disparities. 5  But aside from 
 
1 “COVID-19: Inequality is Our Pre-existing Condition,” UNESCO Inclusive 
Policy Lab, April 14, 2020, https://en.unesco.org/inclusivepolicylab/news/ 
covid-19-inequality-our-pre-existing-condition. 
2 Monica Gandhi, Deborah S. Yokoe, and Daine V. Havlir, “Asymptomatic 
Transmission, the Achilles’ Heel of Current Strategies to Control Covid-19,” The 
New England Journal of Medicine 382, no. 22 (2020), 2159, http://doi.org/ 
10.1056/NEJMe2009758.  
3 See Steve Matthewman and Kate Huppatz, “A Sociology of Covid-19,” 
Journal of Sociology (2020), https://doi.org/10.1177/1440783320939416. 
4 See Clare Bambra et al., “The COVID-19 Pandemic and Health 
Inequalities,” Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health (2020): 1–5, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/jech-2020-214401. 
5 See Paul Farmer, “Social Inequalities and Emerging Infectious Diseases,” 
Emerging Infectious Diseases 2, no. 4 (1996): 259–69; Sandra Crouse Quinn and 
Supriya Kumar, “Health Inequalities and Infectious Diseases Epidemics: A 
Challenge for Global Health Security,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense 
Strategy, Practice, and Science 12, no. 5 (2014): 263–73, https://doi.org/ 
 




revealing, reinforcing, and worsening existing forms of 
socioeconomic inequality, COVID-19 has also produced 
other complex forms of health and non-health inequalities 
relating to social status and civil liberty. These complex 
inequalities are impacts of the drastic and uncoordinated 
responses made by countries to contain the pandemic, 
namely, the imposition of unparalleled restrictions (such as 
travel bans, quarantines, and lockdowns) and the 
implementation of other extraordinary public health 
protocols (such as physical distancing measures), all of 
which have had disproportionate effects on different 
groups of people.6 
 These responses and the inequalities they have produced 
are well illustrated in the Philippines.7 As was the case in 
many other countries, the Philippines’ national government 
officials were slow and unsystematic in responding to the 
pandemic during its earlier stages in the first months of 
2020, and thus missed the chance to comprehensively plan 
 
10.1089/bsp.2014.0032; and Bambra et al., “The COVID-19 Pandemic and 
Health Inequalities.” 
6 See Sharmila Devi, “Travel Restrictions Hampering COVID-19 
Response,” The Lancet 395, no. 10233 (2020): 1331–32, https://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1016%2FS0140-6736(20)30967-3; Margaret Douglas et al., “Mitigating the 
Wider Health Effects of Covid-19 Pandemic Response,” BMJ 369 (2020), 
https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m1557; and Bambra et al., “The COVID-19 
Pandemic and Health Inequalities.” 
7 I will mention only a few specific examples of the Philippines’ COVID-
19 response and of their resultant inequalities here. I will discuss more of these 
in a later work. 




and prepare for it.8 Their delayed and piecemeal response 
resulted not only in preventable medical resource constraints 
(e.g., shortages in test kits, testing-capable laboratories, 
personal protective equipment or PPEs, and health workers) 
but also in many avoidable infections and deaths among 
health workers and the public. It has also led to a problem 
of distribution, as these scarce resources have been 
unequally distributed and those with power and wealth have 
disproportionately had access to them. For example, “VIPs” 
such as government officials have easily been able to get 
tested and have even crowded out testing queues.9  
 
8  See Dessy Bautista and Melissa Luz Lopez, “TIMELINE: How the 
Philippines is Handling COVID-19,” CNN Philippines, April 21, 2020, 
https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/4/21/interactive-timeline-PH-
handling-COVID-19.html; Michael Beltran, “The Philippines’ Pandemic 
Response: A Tragedy of Errors,” Diplomat, May 12, 2020, Southeast Asia, 
https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/the-philippines-pandemic-response-a-tragedy-
of-errors; and Nastassja Quijano, Maria Carmen Fernandez, and Abbey 
Pangilinan, “Misplaced Priorities, Unnecessary Effects: Collective Suffering 
and Survival in Pandemic Philippines,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 18, no. 5 (2020), 
https://apjjf.org/2020/15/QuijanoEtAl.html. 
9 See Prinz Magtulis, “With Only 250 People Tested a Day, Philippine 
Health Sector Appears Ill-Prepared for COVID-19,” PhilStar, March 9, 2020, 
Business, https://www.philstar.com/business/2020/03/09/ 1999444/only-250- 
people-tested-day-philippine-health-sector-appears-ill-prepared-covid-19; 
Pocholo Concepcion, “Gov’t Officials Crowd Out Patients for COVID-19 
Testing,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 23, 2020, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/ 
1246714/govt-officials-crowd-out-patients-for-covid-19-testing; Darryl John 
Esguerra, “DOH: No VIPs but ‘Courtesy’ Given to Key Gov’t Execs,” 
Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 23, 2020, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/ 
1247088/fwd-doh-no-vip-treatment-in-covid-19-testing-but-courtesy-given-to-
security-health-officials; “VERA FILES FACT SHEET: Are PH Health 
Workers Adequately Protected During the COVID-19 Pandemic?,” VERA 
Files, April 27, 2020, https://verafiles.org/articles/ vera-files-fact-sheet-are-ph-
health-workers-adequately-prote; and Ronnie E. Baticulon, “Why Do Filipino 
Health Workers Keep Getting Infected with COVID-19?,” CNN Philippines, 
 




In March 2020, in response to the growing number of 
COVID-19 cases in the country, the Philippine government 
began to impose quarantine measures in the form of 
lockdowns, which were later extended to the end of April 
and which, at the time of writing, remain in effect in a 
modified form across the country. Quarantine measures are 
meant to “flatten the curve”—that is, to lower the number 
of and prevent increases in COVID-19 cases—and thus buy 
time for the country to “raise the line”— that is, to address 
its medical resource constraints and improve its overall 
health care capacity.10  However, these measures have had 
unequal impacts on income and food security. While some 
Filipinos have the means to stay at home in relatively 
comfortable circumstances, many others who cannot afford 
to stockpile need to work and buy food daily. These people 
cannot afford to stay indoors and must go out, running the 
risk of infection or of getting caught for violating quarantine 
restrictions in their effort to feed their families. As a resident 
from an impoverished community in Quezon City put it, 
“‘Di ako natatakot sa COVID-19 na ‘yan, kasi kaya mong  
 
 
May 13, 2020, Culture, https://www.cnn.ph/ life/culture/2020/5/14/health-
workers-opinion.html. 
10 See Xave Gregorio, “Movement of People in Luzon Restricted as Island 
Placed Under ‘Enhanced’ Community Quarantine,” CNN Philippines, March 16, 
2020, https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/3/16/luzon-enhanced-
community-quarantine-covid-19.html; and CNN Philippines Staff, “Luzon-
Wide Lockdown Extended Until April 30 to Stop COVID-19 Spread,” CNN 
Philippines, Aril 7, 2020, https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/4/7/ 
Luzon-lockdown-enhanced-community-quarantine-extension.html. 




gamutin ang sarili mo. Ang nakakatakot diyan ay mamatay kang 
dilat sa gutom. (I am not afraid of that COVID-19, because 
you can cure yourself. What’s frightening is dying with your 
eyes open because of hunger.)”11 
In response to the income and food insecurity caused by 
quarantine measures, many Filipino citizens and civic groups 
have organized and coordinated to provide relief to 
impoverished communities. One such effort is Bayanihang 
Marikenyo at Marikenya (Marikina Solidarity), which 
involves running a regular feeding program through a 
community kitchen set up for affected families in Marikina 
City.12  Ten volunteers from the feeding program were 
arrested on May 1, 2020, during their regular relief 
operations for allegedly holding a mass gathering. Although 
the volunteers had secured the proper permits to conduct  
 
 
11 Rambo Talabong and Jodesz Gavilan, “‘Walang-Wala Na’ [Absolutely 
Nothing]: Poor Filipinos Fear Death from Hunger More Than Coronavirus,” 
Rappler, April 2, 2020, In-Depth, para. 21, https://rappler.com/newsbreak/ in-
depth/poor-filipinos-fear-death-from-hunger-more-than-coronavirus. See also 
Nick Aspinwall, “Coronavirus Lockdown Strikes Fear Among Manila’s Poor,” 
Al Jazeera, March 14, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/ 
coronavirus-lockdown-strikes-fear-manila-poor-200313133102404.html; Geoffrey 
Ducanes, Sarah Lynne Daway-Ducanes, and Edita Tan, “Addressing the 
Needs of Highly Vulnerable Households in Luzon During the Covid-19 
Lockdown” (Ateneo Center for Economic Research and Development 
Working Paper No. 2020-01, Department of Economics, Ateneo de Manila 
University, March 2020), https://ideas.repec.org/p/agy/dpaper/202001.html; 
Beltran, “The Philippines’ Pandemic Response”; and Quijano, Fernandez, and 
Pangilinan, “Misplaced Priorities, Unnecessary Effects.” 
12  See Janess Ann J. Ellao, “Women’s Group Provides Warm Meals for 
Marikina’s Poor Residents,” Bulatlat, March 30, 2020, https://www.bulatlat.com/ 
2020/03/30/womens-group-provides-warm-meals-for-marikina-residents. 




relief operations and had followed physical distancing 
measures, the chief officer of the National Capital Region 
Police Office (NCRPO), Debold Sinas, claimed that they 
had violated quarantine restrictions. However, over a week 
later, the NCRPO’s Public Information Office published on 
its Facebook page photographs of Sinas’s birthday party, 
which took place a week after the arrest of the volunteers. 
The party was attended by dozens of guests—it was a kind 
of mass gathering in other words—and the photographs 
showed many guests not adhering to physical distancing 
measures. The photographs and the party triggered outrage 
over the unequal enforcement of quarantine restrictions, 
especially since the Philippine National Police chief and 
even the Philippine President himself excused Sinas’s 
behavior and came to his defense.13 
These examples illustrate some of the many ways in 
which inequality has been a feature of the COVID-19 
pandemic. One way of understanding the different forms of  
 
 
13 See Neil Jayson Servallos, “Marikina Mayor, Cops Clash Over Volunteers’ 
Arrest,” PhilStar, May 2, 2020, Nation, https://www.philstar.com/nation/ 
2020/05/02/2011196/marikina-mayor-cops-clash-over-volunteers-arrest; Barnaby 
Lo, “Senior Philippine Cop’s Lockdown Birthday Bash Draws Outrage,” CBS 
News, May 13, 2020, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/philippines-police-
chief-debold-sinas-coronavirus-lockdown-birthday-party-draws-outrage-2020-
05-13; “‘I Don’t Think Na Merong Violation’ [I Don’t Think There Is a 
Violation]: PNP Chief Defends Sinas’ Birthday Fête,” ABS-CBN News, May 13, 
2020, https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/05/13/20/i-dont-think-na-merong-
violation-pnp-chief-defends-sinas-birthday-fte; and Leila B. Salaverria, “Duterte 
on Keeping Sinas: ‘It’s on Me’,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 21, 2020, 
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1278499/duterte-keeps-sinas-its-on-me. 




inequality that have been reinforced and produced by 
COVID-19 is with reference to the distinction between 
“distributive equality” and “relational equality,” which is key 
to contemporary egalitarian theory. Simply put, distributive 
equality is equality in the distribution of goods, while 
relational equality is equality in social relations. 14  In the 
words of Elizabeth Anderson, 
Equality in the distributive conception consists 
in the mere coincidence of what one person has 
with what others in the comparison class 
independently have and need not entail that the 
persons being compared stand in any social 
relations with one another. They might even live 
on different planets and have no interactions 
with each other. On the relational view, the only 
comparisons that fundamentally matter are 
among those who stand in social relations with  
one another and in which the goods of equality 
are essentially relations of equal (symmetrical and 
reciprocal) authority, recognition, and standing.15 
Relational equality is broader and arguably more nuanced 
than distributive equality because distributive equality does 
not and cannot fully capture relational equality. 16  For 
 
14  Elizabeth Anderson, “Equality,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Philosophy, ed. David Estlund (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 40.  
15 Ibid., 41. 
16 Ibid., 40–41. 




example, assigning separate testing centers for “VIPs” and 
for ordinary Filipino citizens to prevent the former from 
crowding out testing queues may meet the requirement of 
distributive equality, but even if we make sure that the 
testing centers are proportional, the whole arrangement will 
not meet the requirement of relational equality. This is 
because the former are by definition considered “very 
important” while the latter are not. In other words, the 
arrangement is disrespectful toward ordinary Filipino 
citizens who are classified as unimportant. Thus, this 
arrangement fails to see them as equals of the “VIPs.”  
The relationship between distributive equality and 
relational equality therefore is that the latter encompasses 
the former and that the former is grounded in the latter. 
As Anderson puts it, “Within the relational view, 
distributive concerns appear as but one part of the 
egalitarian agenda. Distributions matter as causes, 
consequences, or constituents of social relations.”17 The  
relational definition of equality therefore “better embodies 
the full range of normative concerns of egalitarians than the 
distributive conception.”18 
 
17 Anderson, “Equality,” 53. 
18  Ibid., 55. A different but similar way to frame the relation between 
distributive and relational equality is to see it as the relation between 
redistribution and recognition. Put very simply, “redistribution” refers to the 
egalitarian conception of distributive justice that comes from the Rawlsian 
tradition of analytic philosophy, while “recognition” refers to the conception 
of individual identity as being conditioned on intersubjective and reciprocal 
regard, which is rooted in the Hegelian tradition of continental philosophy. 
The debate on redistribution and recognition emerges from a difference in 
 




To locate distributive equality within relational equality 
and to argue that the latter rather than the former embodies 
the ideals of egalitarianism is to take the view of relational 
egalitarianism, which is one of the dominant variants of 
contemporary egalitarian theory. According to this view, 
“The core of the value of equality does not . . . consist in the 
idea that there is something that must be distributed or 
allocated equally . . . . Instead, the core of the value is a 
normative conception of human relations, and the relevant 
question, when interpreting the value, is what social, 
political, and economic arrangements are compatible with 
that conception.” 19  Precisely because it takes this view, 
relational egalitarianism allows for an understanding of 
equality as it is historically articulated in the concerns of 
contemporary egalitarian social movements and thus 
“enables a sociologically more sophisticated range of 
critiques of inequality as well as richer conceptions of what a 
society of equals could look like.”20 
Given the distinction and relationship between 
distributive and relational equality, and through the more 
historically and sociologically sensitive lens of relational 
 
philosophical traditions, while the debate on distributive and relational equality 
emerges from critiques within one philosophical tradition. My research finds 
its place in the latter debate rather than the former. For more on the 
redistribution and recognition, see Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, 
Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange, trans. Joel Golb, 
James Ingram, and Christiane Wilke (London: Verso, 2003).  
19 Samuel Scheffler, “What is Egalitarianism?,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 31, 
no. 1 (Winter 2003), 31. 
20 Anderson, “Equality,” 46. 




egalitarianism, I can now more clearly identify the earlier 
examples of the impacts of the Philippines’ COVID-19 
response as illustrations of the following complex and 
intertwining forms of inequality, namely: the unequal 
distribution of medical resources, the unequal impacts of 
quarantine measures, and the unequal enforcement of 
quarantine restrictions. I want to examine these three forms 
of inequality associated with COVID-19.21 
The preceding discussion shows that the inequalities 
reinforced and produced by the COVID-19 pandemic are 
not only of the distributive sort. Yes, they are essentially 
health disparities that are tied to distributive differences in 
socioeconomic factors, but these disparities and differences 
are in turn rooted in relational inequalities embodied by 
social hierarchies of power, esteem, and standing. As such 
they call for an understanding of and a response to the  
pandemic not only in terms of public health and economics  
but also in terms of social justice. This claim, however, 
requires further clarification and justification precisely 
because the inequalities involved are complex. They overlap 
and intertwine with one another and go beyond mere 
distributive inequalities. In this regard, the relational 
egalitarian view will be most helpful. With its sensitivity to a 
broader, more nuanced, and more grounded kind of  
 
 
21 These are of course not the only inequalities associated with COVID-19, 
but keeping to these three inequalities will significantly clarify my focus. 




inequality, relational egalitarianism can provide a 
philosophical framework to identify and examine injustices 
in the context of COVID-19—which, as will be made clear 
later, is the first key step in the pursuit of justice in health—
and offer some guidance for justice-oriented decisions in 
pandemic preparedness and response. 
All in all, and with the bigger picture of COVID-19 in 
mind, I ask the following central question: What does 
relational egalitarian justice require in responding to the 
inequalities of the COVID-19 pandemic in the Philippines? 
This question means that I will take the relational egalitarian 
view in examining COVID-19. More precisely, I aim to 
construct a relational egalitarian framework to systematically 
examine why the three complex and intertwining inequalities 
that have been reinforced and produced by the pandemic 
are unjust, and to work out, with the broad relational 
egalitarian vision of a society of equals in mind, what 
structural changes and processes might be required to justly 
respond to these inequalities. In doing so, I hope to also 
contribute to a more refined understanding of relational 
egalitarian theory in general. 
Put simply, my aims are to examine inequality in the 
context of COVID-19 through the lens of relational 
egalitarianism and to work out an account of what it means 
to address them justly. As such I hope to contribute to the 
growing body of research on the connection between 
pandemics such as COVID-19 and inequality, to the 




literature on the pursuit of justice in pandemic preparedness 
and response, and to the general understanding of the 
relational egalitarian view of health and of relational 
egalitarianism as a theory. 
Literature Review 
It has already been established that there is a connection 
between COVID-19 and inequality, but there is little to no 
research on the inequalities associated with the pandemic 
through the lens of contemporary egalitarianism—much less 
relational egalitarianism. It is in this broad space within the 
growing body of research on COVID-19 and inequality 
where my research finds its place and will do its work. 
Given my research topic and central question, my 
research falls mainly under the category of political 
philosophy, particularly belonging to the application of 
egalitarian theory to issues of justice in health. However, 
because it also asks about pandemics, which are an 
epidemiological concern, my research will also engage with 
public health research, specifically on justice in health or 
health equity. The literature review is structured around 
these two broad bodies of research. 
While there is already an established body of work on the 
topic of pursuing justice in health, there is not enough 
literature on the topic in the context of extreme health crises 
such as pandemics. My research will thus also contribute to 
the literature on the pursuit of justice in pandemic 
preparedness and response by providing a relational 




egalitarian account of what it means to justly respond to the 
inequalities of COVID-19. 
Egalitarian Justice and Health 
There is already a large and solid body of research on the 
general theme of contemporary egalitarianism and health. 
Some works under this theme clearly have their roots in 
political philosophy, while others are more grounded in 
public health research. Whether from the former or latter 
field, the overall concern of the literature on the theme of 
egalitarian justice and health is the same: the problem of 
health inequality. 
Most of the work under this theme from the side of 
political philosophy focuses on figuring out as exactly as 
possible what theories of egalitarian justice require in 
addressing health inequality. Initially this focus meant a shift 
in the approach toward problems in health in general. For 
example, in his seminal work Just Health Care,22 philosopher 
Norman Daniels aimed to move beyond and away from the 
tendency to understand and treat problems in health from a 
bioethics perspective and through ethical terms. He thus 
attempted to construct a comprehensive theory of 
distributive justice for health grounded in John Rawls’s 
theory of justice as fairness.23 
 
22 Norman Daniels, Just Health Care (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985). 
23 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1999). 




The work of figuring out what egalitarian justice requires 
in terms of health shifted again, however, when work in 
public health research started drawing attention to and 
examining the social determinants of health. Simply put, 
these determinants are the controllable and intervenable 
socioeconomic factors that have been proven to have effects 
on health outcomes.24 Research on these factors and their 
relation to health has shed light on the existence of a social 
gradient in health—“the phenomenon whereby people who 
are less advantaged in terms of socioeconomic position have 
worse health (and shorter lives) than those who are more 
advantaged.”25 Such a gradient thus called for a broadening 
in the scope of justice in health and for a realignment of 
goals in addressing the problem of social injustice. As 
epidemiologist Michael Marmot put it,  
We should have two societal goals: improving 
health for everybody and reducing health 
inequalities. Others may see them as being in 
conflict, but they are two separable goals. Both 
are worthy and should be pursued. I have never 
argued that an overall improvement in health  
should be sacrificed in the pursuit of narrower 
 
24 See Michael Marmot, “Social Causes of Social Inequalities in Health,” in 
Public Health, Ethics, and Equity, ed. Sudhir Anand, Fabienne Peter, and 
Amartya Sen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 37–61. 
25 Angela J. M. Donkin, “Social Gradient,” in The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia 
of Health, Illness, Behavior, and Society, ed. William C. Cockerham, Robert 
Dingwall, and Stella R. Quah (2014), para. 1, https://doi.org/10.1002/ 
9781118410868.wbehibs530. 




health inequalities. Given my general thesis that, 
to oversimplify, good health results from a good 
set of social arrangements, I would look to 
sacrifice other social goals . . . before accepting 
that there had to be a tradeoff between these two 
health goals.26 
With the above in mind, Daniels updated his views and 
arguments regarding egalitarian justice and health in his 
follow-up work Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly, 27 
published over 20 years after Just Health Care. He recognized 
that in his earlier work on the matter he had not paid 
enough attention to the population view of health that 
animates public health research and had limited his 
understanding of health inequality to inequality in health 
care. He thus reconstructed his theory of distributive justice 
for health in accordance with the latest developments in 
public health research involving the social determinants of 
health. In his own words, 
If health has special moral importance 
because of its impact on opportunity, then 
these other determinants of health have 
special importance comparable to that of 
 
26 Michael Marmot, “Fair Society Health Lives,” in Inequalities in Health: 
Concepts, Measures, and Ethics, ed. Nir Eyal et al. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 283. 
27 Norman Daniels, Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008).  




health care. The broad determinants of health 
and its distribution in a population include 
income and wealth, education, political 
participation, the distributions of rights and 
powers, and opportunity. These are quite 
centrally the goods that any general theory of 
social justice is concerned about. We cannot 
achieve effective promotion of health in a 
society as well as its fair distribution without a 
just distribution of these other goods.28 
Since it is now understood that health is influenced by 
other factors that are controllable and intervenable, it is now 
unreasonable to insist that health is purely a natural good. 
This is in contrast to Rawls’s initial position on the matter 
since he considered health to be a natural good that is not 
directly under the control of the basic structure of society 
and is thus outside the scope of distributive justice. 29 
Though Rawls eventually later recognized that health is not 
simply a product of natural factors, he still did not consider 
it a primary social good.  
Philosophers like Daniels thus needed to work to extend 
the scope of Rawls’s theory of justice to include health by 
broadening the Rawlsian notion of fair opportunity.30 Even 
health outcomes that seem natural, according to Daniels, in 
 
28 Daniels, Just Health, 4. 
29 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 54–55. 
30 Daniels, Just Health, 56–60. 




the sense that they appear to be uncontrollable and a matter 
of luck (e.g., disability or illness), can no longer be said to be 
outside the scope of justice since the outcome itself as well 
as its effects can still be mitigated and improved through 
intervention or treatment. As Daniels puts it, “An account 
of justice must explain what assistance we owe each other in 
meeting such needs [for intervention or treatment], even 
when no one is responsible for making us needy. We should 
not allow misfortune to beget injustice.”31  
In addition to health no longer being a natural good and 
thus now belonging to the scope of justice, health is now 
also more clearly a matter of relational equality since it 
involves factors that are tied to unequal social relations 
within and among populations (e.g., the unequal relation 
between rich and poor, or the unequal relation between 
non-minority groups and minority groups).32 In this sense, 
Daniels is a relational egalitarian, for while a large part of 
his work is about figuring out how to justly distribute and 
allocate goods and resources relevant to health inequalities 
(i.e., a large part of his work operates in terms of 
distributive equality), his work is also situated within the 
broader vision of addressing relational inequalities in 
society at large. Put differently, Daniels does not only 
consider health inequalities to be unjust on their own; he  
 
 
31 Daniels, Just Health, 13. 
32 Ibid., 14. 




also considers health inequalities to be unjust because they 
are rooted in relational inequalities that are unjust. In his 
words, “The fact that health is not simply the product of 
health care means that we cannot easily isolate health from 
broader social justice.”33 
A range of other political philosophers have engaged with 
Daniels’s work. 34  Shlomi Segall, 35  for instance, has 
questioned Daniels’s broadening of the scope of justice by 
including in the Rawslian notion of fair opportunity not only 
health care but also health. If health is of special importance 
and if health care is simply one of the many factors that 
affect health as Daniels argued in Just Health, then why 
bother with a theory of justice specifically for health? Why 
not formulate instead a general theory of justice to address 
inequalities, say, in the social determinants of health or even 
in other non-health factors that may impact opportunities? 
In Segall’s words, “Once one broadens one’s concern from 
the narrow and defined sphere of health care, one finds it 
difficult to justify being content with equalizing that part of 
opportunities that is due to health and leaving untouched 
that part of it that is owed to talents [i.e., that is not due to 
 
33 Daniels, Just Health, 23. 
34 See, for example, the “Norman Daniels Symposium” section of Journal of 
Medical Ethics 35, no. 1 (2009): 1–41, https://www.jstor.org/stable/i27720240. 
35 Shlomi Segall, “Is Health (Really) Special? Health Policy between Rawlsian 
and Luck Egalitarian Justice,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 27, no. 4 (2010): 344–
58, http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.2010.00499.x. See also Shlomi Segall, 
“Is Health Care (Still) Special?” The Journal of Political Philosophy 15, no. 3 (2007): 
342–61, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2007.00284.x. 




health].” 36  Segall then argues against Daniels’s broadly 
relational egalitarian position for a luck egalitarian and 
prioritarian 37  theory of egalitarian justice, which does not 
consider health to be of special importance, which is 
sensitive to the role of personal responsibility in health, 
which allows for prioritization based on personal 
responsibility in cases when there are resource constraints, 
and which is capable of addressing objections against it that 
argue it is either too narrow or too wide in its scope.38 
For his part, in response to criticisms and objections 
against his theory of justice for health such as those from 
Segall, Daniels has insisted on the special importance of 
health care. Even if he has broadened the scope of justice to 
include health and its social determinants, health care 
remains to be a significant good to be distributed justly in 
his theory of justice. As he puts it, “Even in an ideally just 
distribution of the social determinants of health (leave  
 
 
36 Segall, “Is Health (Really) Special?” 347. 
37 “Luck egalitarianism” is a term coined by Anderson. Briefly, it is the theory 
of justice that argues that “people should be compensated for undeserved 
misfortunes and that the compensation should come only from that part of others’ 
good fortune that is undeserved.” Elizabeth Anderson, “What is the Point of 
Equality?,” Ethics 109, no. 2 (1999): 290, https://doi.org/10.1086/233897.   
“Prioritarianism” is a variant of luck egalitarianism that argues that “justice 
requires us to maximize a function of human well-being that gives priority to 
improving the well-being of those who are badly off and of those who, if badly 
off, are not substantially responsible for their condition in virtue of their prior 
conduct.” Richard J. Arneson, “Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism,” 
Ethics 110, no. 2 (2000): 340, http://doi.org/10.1086/233272. 
38 Segall, “Is Health (Really) Special?,” 348–56. 




healthcare aside) people will encounter disease or injury or 
disability that undermines their opportunity. Consequently, 
healthcare remains of special moral importance to protecting 
opportunity since we cannot prevent all ill health.”39 
The significance of health care is evident in the literature 
on relational egalitarianism and health. In their article 
examining the relational egalitarian approach to health, 40 
Kristin Voigt and Gry Wester point out that most of the 
work in this relatively small area of research argues for the 
special importance and value of health care. Moreover, they 
show that relational egalitarians recognize not only the 
instrumental value of health care in protecting opportunity 
and promoting good health, as clearly seen in Daniels’s 
work, but also its expressive value—that is, that the provision 
of health care expresses respect and concern toward its 
recipients as equals.41  
The expressive value of health care brings to light the 
relational aspect of health inequality. From the relational 
egalitarian perspective, health inequality is not only about 
the social gradient in health, its distributive differences in 
health outcomes or disproportions in the distribution of 
health care, or of the social determinants of health. Health 
 
39 Normal Daniels, “Just Health: Replies and Further Thoughts,” Journal of 
Medical Ethics 35, no. 1 (2009): 38, http://doi.org/10.1136/jme.2008.026831. 
40  Kristin Voigt and Gry Wester, “Relational Equality and Health,” 
Social Philosophy and Policy 31, no. 2 (2015): 204–9, http://doi.org/10.1017/ 
S0265052514000326. 
41 Ibid., 211–14. 




inequality is also about the social and structural factors that 
have led to such distributive differences and disproportions, 
that have led to such a gradient, and about what these 
factors express toward people.  
This relational aspect of health inequality is clearly seen in 
the work of Thomas Pogge, whom Voigt and Wester 
identify as the only relational egalitarian who has attempted 
to directly and comprehensively assess whether health 
inequalities are just or unjust.42 Pogge for his part argues that  
in shaping an institutional order, we should be 
more concerned, morally, that it not 
substantially contribute to the incidence of 
medical conditions than that it prevent 
medical conditions caused by other factors. 
And we should design any institutional order 
so that it prioritises the mitigation of medical 
conditions whose incidence it substantially 
contributes to. In institutional contexts as 
well, moral assessment must then be sensitive 
not merely to the distribution of health 
outcomes as such, but also to how these 
outcomes are produced.43 
 
42 Voigt and Wester, “Relational Equality and Health,” 214. See Thomas W. 
Pogge, “Relational Conceptions of Justice: Responsibilities for Health 
Outcomes,” in Public Health, Ethics, and Equity, ed. Sudhir Anand, Fabienne 
Peter, and Amartya Sen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 135–61. 
43 Pogge, “Relational Conceptions of Justice,” 135. 




This means that in determining whether a health inequality 
is just or unjust, Pogge focuses on the role a particular 
“institutional order” or social arrangement plays in 
producing or causing “medical conditions” or, as he also 
calls them, “deficits” in health. The degree to which the 
deficit is unjust can be determined by the interaction among 
the following: the degree to which an institution causes a 
particular deficit in health (as observed in the way it is 
ordered or arranged), the attitude expressed by the 
institution toward individuals (again, through its order or 
arrangement), and the degree of the medical severity of the 
deficit involved.44  
For Voigt and Wester, two conclusions can be gleaned 
about health inequalities from Pogge’s relational egalitarian 
approach: first, “where our social and economic 
arrangements lead to health deficits, these can constitute 
injustices even if governments do not intend such effects,”45 
and second, health inequalities “that have natural causes but 
that could be addressed by social institutions” could be 
unjust.46 Voigt and Wester thus conclude that “a broader 
range of health inequalities could be considered unjust from 
a relational perspective than one might initially assume.”47 
 
44 Pogge, “Relational Conceptions of Justice,”156–57. 
45 Voigt and Wester, “Relational Equality and Health,” 218. 
46 Ibid., 219. 
47 Ibid. 




Pogge’s approach to assessing whether health 
inequalities are just or unjust finds an analogue in Jeffrey 
Brown’s “egalitarian contribution principle.” In his article 
applying relational egalitarianism to the problem of 
disability injustice,48 Brown argues that the inequalities and 
disadvantages experienced by disabled people are unjust 
because they arise from social structures that are ableist and 
thus disrespectful toward the disabled. While it is not 
implausible to say that some of the inequalities and 
disadvantages disabled people experience are “natural” 
consequences of being disabled, Brown argues that most of 
these inequalities and disadvantages are the effects of how 
institutions distribute opportunities and resources. Thus, as 
Brown’s egalitarian contribution principle states, institutions 
can be said to contribute to relational inequality if their  
conduct was necessary to the causal sequence that led to the 
relational inequality involved and if their conduct initiated, 
facilitated, or sustained it.49 
All in all, what Pogge and Brown show, aside from the 
relational aspect of health inequality, is that my chief aim is 
feasible—that relational egalitarianism can effectively 
provide a philosophical framework for identifying unjust 
health inequalities and for examining the structural roots of 
 
48  See Jeffrey M. Brown, “Relational Equality and Disability Injustice,” 
Journal of Moral Philosophy 16, no. 3 (2019): 327–57, https://doi.org/10.1163/ 
17455243-20180008. 
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these inequalities. Knowing which health inequalities are 
unjust and understanding the mechanisms that cause them 
from a relational egalitarian viewpoint can enable further 
research toward the advancement of justice in health, 
especially in the area of how health policies and programs 
are developed.50 This latter point echoes and dovetails with 
another point I made earlier about how relational 
egalitarianism can provide a philosophical framework to 
identify and understand the injustices associated with the 
COVID-19 pandemic: Because relational egalitarianism is 
sensitive to a broader, more nuanced, and more grounded 
kind of inequality (i.e., relational inequality) it can thus 
provide a philosophical framework to examine health 
inequalities that extend beyond distributive inequalities and 
offer some guidance for decisions and actions geared toward 
the pursuit of justice in health. 
What would happen if we applied relational egalitarianism 
to the inequalities reinforced and produced by COVID-19? 
Or as I ask, what does relational egalitarian justice require in 
responding to the inequalities of the COVID-19 pandemic 
in the Philippines? There is no research yet on these 
questions nor any literature on contemporary egalitarianism 
in general as it is applied to pandemics such as COVID-19.  
 
 
50 Voigt and Wester, “Relational Equality and Health,” 225. See also Erika 
Blacksher, “Redistribution and Recognition: Pursuing Social Justice in Public 
Health,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 21, no. 3 (2012): 320–31, 
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It this within this space in the literature where my 
research—which aims to construct a relational egalitarian 
framework to identify, examine, and respond to the unjust 
inequalities associated with COVID-19—will do its work. 
There is clearly more to learn about contemporary 
egalitarianism and, more specifically, relational egalitarianism 
as it is applied to health in the context of pandemics.  
Health Equity Research  
The topic of pursuing justice in health is neither 
exclusive nor original to research on theories of egalitarian 
justice and health inequality within the field of political 
philosophy. Instead, the pursuit of justice in health more 
suitably falls under health equity within the field of public 
health research, where there is an overwhelmingly large 
body of literature. Since my research is primarily about 
relational egalitarianism as it is applied to the context of a 
specific public health problem, my research more properly 
belongs to the field of political philosophy. As such, to 
keep things concise, this portion of the literature review 
will focus only on notable works from health equity 
research that are relevant to my topic and that show where 
and how relational egalitarianism can contribute. 
We can begin with a definition of health equity to see 
how research on it connects and overlaps with the 
contemporary egalitarian view of health. In the words of 
health equity researchers and advocates Paula Braveman and 
Sofia Gruskin, 




For the purposes of operationalisation and 
measurement, equity in health can be defined as 
the absence of systematic disparities in health (or 
in the major social determinants of health) 
between social groups who have different levels 
of underlying social advantage/disadvantage—
that is, different positions in a social hierarchy. 
Inequities in health systematically put groups of 
people who are already socially disadvantaged 
(for example, by virtue of being poor, female, 
and/or members of a disenfranchised racial, 
ethnic, or religious group) at further 
disadvantage with respect to their health; health 
is essential to wellbeing and to overcoming other 
effects of social disadvantage.51 
Apart from this definition of health equity already taking 
the social determinants of health into consideration, what is 
significant about it is that it sees health inequalities not as 
differences between individuals but rather between social 
groups. Moreover, these groups are recognized as belonging 
to a social hierarchy that advantages or disadvantages the 
health of groups depending on their positions in the said 
hierarchy. It is this structural and systematic advantaging 
or disadvantaging of health in groups that makes 
 
51 Paula Braveman and Sofia Gruskin, “Defining Equity in Health,” Journal 
of Epidemiology and Community Health 57, no. 4 (2003), 254, http://doi.org/ 
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inequalities unjust and thus it is the focus of health equity 
research. In other words, to pursue health equity is to 
work on narrowing health inequalities brought about by 
social hierarchies. 
Braveman and Gruskin’s definition of health equity 
shows that the relational egalitarian view of health inequality 
is compatible with how health equity researchers and 
advocates approach health inequality. The two are 
compatible because both are sensitive to a broader, more 
nuanced, and more grounded kind of inequality—the kind 
that is irreducible to differences in distribution, that is 
rooted in institutional or structural mechanisms that leave 
groups of people on unequal footing. Simply put, the pursuit 
of health equity is a relational egalitarian concern. 
What then can relational egalitarianism lend or contribute 
to health equity research and more importantly, to the 
pursuit of health equity? As a chiefly philosophical work on 
relational egalitarianism applied to an epidemiological 
concern, what can my research add to the discussion? 
Specifically, relational egalitarianism can contribute to 
health equity research by providing some guidance for 
decisions and actions in the process of pursuing health 
equity. Health equity, after all, is both an outcome to be 
achieved and the process of working toward that outcome.52 
This process is comprised of several steps, namely, 
 
52 Paula Braveman et al., What Is Health Equity? And What Difference Does a 
Definition Make? (Princeton, NJ: Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 2017), 3.  




identifying health inequalities that are unjust and of concern 
to those who are affected by them, changing institutional 
and structural mechanisms to narrow the inequalities 
involved (e.g., changing policies), evaluating and monitoring 
these changes using short- and long-term measures, and 
reassessing health equity strategies on a regular basis. This 
process is iterative, that is, it is a cyclical process of 
improvement that does not have a clear beginning or end.53 
Given the above, we can say that relational egalitarianism can 
mostly help in the first two steps in the process of working 
toward health equity. As I argue, relational egalitarianism can 
effectively provide a philosophical framework to identify, 
examine, and respond to injustices in health.  
Certainly, health equity researchers and advocates have 
their own frameworks with which to do these first two steps 
in the health equity process, but their frameworks tend to 
lean heavily toward epidemiology, focusing on the 
distributive factors of disease and ill health.54 This tendency 
is understandable as disease and ill health are 
epidemiological concerns that exemplify health inequalities 
brought about by social hierarchies. But this tendency can 
also overshadow health equity or justice in health as an 
outcome to be achieved. Such an overshadowing is 
 
53 Braveman et al., What Is Health Equity?, 6–8.. 
54 Sridhar Venkatapuram and Michael Marmot, “Epidemiology and Social 
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illustrated well in the area of research on preparing for and 
responding to extreme health crises such as pandemics. The 
issue of social justice in relation to health does not figure 
prominently in the literature on pandemic preparedness and 
response.55 Instead what is prominent are the formal and 
scientific epidemiological aspects of preparing for and 
responding to pandemics, namely, reviewing and amending 
technical policies regarding pandemic response, developing 
disease detection and surveillance tools and methods, 
and formulating pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical 
control strategies.56  
Apart from leaning heavily toward epidemiology, the bulk 
of the research on pandemics also tends toward framing the 
problem of health inequality in terms of ethics (e.g., the 
 
55 See Harvey Kayman and Angela Ablorh-Odjidja, “Revisiting Public 
Health Preparedness: Incorporating Social Justice Principles into Pandemic 
Preparedness Planning for Influenza,” Journal of Public Health Management and 
Practice 12, no. 4 (July–August 2006): 373–80, http://doi.org/10.1097/ 
00124784-200607000-00011; Lawrence O. Gostin, “Why should We Care 
about Social Justice?,” The Hastings Center Report 37, no. 4 (2007): 3, 
https://doi.org/10.1353/hcr.2007.0054; Lori Uscher-Pines et al., “Planning 
for an Influenza Pandemic: Social Justice and Disadvantaged Groups,” The 
Hastings Center Report 37, no. 4 (July–August 2007): 32–39, https://doi.org/ 
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Public Health 102, no. 4 (April 2012): 586–91, http://doi.org/10.2105/ 
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obligations of health workers in extreme health crises, or 
ethical issues that may arise from vaccine development) and 
thus “does not specifically address the needs of socially and 
economically disadvantaged groups.”57 As a result, “Common 
pandemic preparedness strategies to reduce transmission may 
be nominally fair and neutral but create disparities when 
applied in contexts beset with inequalities. . . . Thus, rather 
than ameliorating structural inequalities, pandemic 
preparedness strategies sometimes contribute to them.”58 In 
response to this oversight, there has been a growing 
recognition of the need to more consciously incorporate 
considerations of justice that are specifically aimed at the  
reduction and elimination of health inequalities brought 
about by social hierarchies in preparing for and responding 
to pandemics. 
Given the above, a relational egalitarian framework, 
which I aim to construct, can provide a unique philosophical 
perspective that is specifically focused on social justice in 
relation to health and that can work alongside existing 
epidemiological and ethical frameworks in the process of 
working toward health equity in general and in the context  
of pandemics. As Sridhar Venkatapuram and Marmot put it, 
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Philosophical reasoning has to become more 
explicit in epidemiology and the causation and 
distribution of health has to become more 
central to social justice philosophy. In order for 
the reasoning used in epidemiology as a whole to 
be sound, for its scope and (moral) purpose as a 
science to be clarified, and equally as important, 
for philosophical theorizing on social justice to 
be relevant and coherent, epidemiology and 
philosophy need to set in motion a meaningful 
exchange of ideas that flows in both directions.59 
My research then will contribute to the literature on the 
“meaningful exchange” between political philosophy and 
epidemiology in public health research—more specifically,  
between contemporary egalitarianism and health equity 
research—about the process of working toward health 
equity. More precisely, through the relational egalitarian 
framework it aims to construct, my research will contribute 
to the growing literature in the area between contemporary 
egalitarianism and health equity research about what it 
means to pursue justice in health in preparing for and 
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Overview of the Work 
Methodologically, my research will be an exercise in 
“nonideal theory.” As Anderson puts it, nonideal theory 
does “not advance principles and ideals for a perfectly just 
society,” but instead advances “ones that we need to cope 
with the injustices in our current world, and to move us to 
something better,” and as such starts “from a diagnosis of 
injustices in our actual world, rather than from a picture of 
an ideal world.”60 
Adopting nonideal theory in my research has its 
advantages. To begin with, the methodological movement of 
nonideal theory follows the same rhythm, so to speak, as the 
process of pursuing justice in health, of advancing health 
equity. As it will be shown later, the approach of nonideal 
theory begins with the identification of a problem and then  
works toward understanding the problem better and figuring 
out how to solve it. This is in step with the approach 
adopted in public health research on health equity, which 
begins with identifying health inequalities that require 
addressing and then moves on to working out what to do to 
address them. Such a methodological compatibility facilitates 
a smoother exchange between contemporary egalitarian 
theory and public health research. 
Aside from the reasons specific to my research, however, 
there are also other methodological reasons to adopt 
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nonideal theory. Anderson for her part says that there are 
three reasons to do so. The first reason is to acknowledge 
and emphasize that whatever principles or ideals we 
formulate about justice must be suited to the human 
condition.61 In other words, nonideal theory recognizes that 
human beings are not perfectly rational individuals and that 
we must understand what motivates and shapes the 
behavior and reasoning of real human beings if we are to 
come up with institutional and structural mechanisms to 
pursue justice. The human condition therefore does not only 
factually and feasibly constrain our principles and ideals of 
justice; it is also precisely what animates and calls for them.62 
The second reason is that if we do not adopt nonideal 
theory in political philosophy and instead adopt ideal theory, 
“we risk leaping to the conclusion that any gaps we see 
between our ideal and reality must be the cause of the 
problems in our actual world, and that the solution must 
therefore be to adopt policies aimed at directly closing the 
gaps.” 63  For instance, in the context of the COVID-19 
pandemic, the ideal situation would be one wherein 
everyone is willing to give up a bit of their liberty to follow 
quarantine measures and thus stop the spread of the disease. 
But that is not the case. Beginning with this ideal scenario in 
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mind may lead us to identify people’s unwillingness to give 
up a bit of their liberty as the cause of the spread of the 
disease. Such a “misdiagnosis,” as Anderson might call it, 
may lead to inappropriate or mismatched solutions such as 
the authoritarian and militaristic enforcement of quarantine 
restrictions in response to what is essentially a public health 
and social protection problem.64 
The third reason to adopt nonideal theory, which is 
related to the second reason, is that “starting from ideal 
theory may prevent us from recognizing injustices in our 
nonideal world.” 65  In other words, aside from possibly 
leading to inappropriate or mismatched solutions, starting 
with what is ideal may also lead us to gloss over or even 
neglect actual and current problems of justice and their 
causes. Going back to the COVID-19 example, starting with 
the ideal scenario in mind may cause us to overlook how 
quarantine measures could be unjust to begin with because 
they fail to consider that following quarantine measures rests 
not only on one’s willingness to stay at home but also one’s 
ability to do so, which is largely determined by one’s 
socioeconomic status.66  
 
64  See Beltran, “The Philippines’ Pandemic Response”; and Quijano, 
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These reasons show that nonideal theory as Anderson 
conceives it—based on the terms in Laura Valentini’s 
conceptual map of the debate about ideal and nonideal 
theory—is realistic and transitional.67 It is a realistic theory 
because, as mentioned earlier, it is both constrained and 
animated by the realities of the human condition. Moreover, 
it recognizes that as human beings we already intuitively 
appreciate what injustice is and as such we do not need a 
completely fleshed out account of justice for us to know that 
there are problems that need addressing.68 Through nonideal 
theory, what we can do  is to examine our intuitions regarding 
injustice and to provide concepts and frameworks to further 
refine or maybe even replace them and work out a better 
working account of justice.  
The realistic nature of Anderson’s conception of nonideal 
theory connects to it being a transitional theory as well, 
being a theory that allows for “transitional improvements 
without necessarily determining what the ‘optimum’ is.”69 
Simply put, nonideal theory recognizes that justice is an 
outcome to be aimed for just as much as it is the process of 
working toward that outcome; it is therefore unnecessary to 
exhaustively work out what it means to aim for justice for us 
to start working toward it. We do not need “to know what is 
ideal in order to improve. Knowledge of the better does not 
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require knowledge of the best.”70 Ideals therefore are not 
congealed aims that are prerequisites for working toward 
justice. Rather, as Anderson argues, ideals function as 
hypothetical and imagined solutions to problems of justice 
that need to be constantly tested and reassessed.71 
With nonideal theory as my methodological approach, I 
will rely on the following guiding process from Anderson 
to unpack and operationalize my central question and 
build my arguments: 
In nonideal theory, normative inquiry begins 
with the identification of a problem. We then 
seek a causal explanation of the problem to 
determine what can and ought to be done about 
it, and who should be charged with correcting it. 
This requires an evaluation of the mechanisms 
causing the problem, as well as the responsibility 
of different agents to alter these mechanisms. If 
they are unjust, we then consider how these 
mechanisms can be dismantled.72 
Given the above, and through three sub-questions, my 
research will work toward and carry out its aims: to 
construct a relational egalitarian framework to identify and 
examine which of the inequalities that have been reinforced 
and produced by the COVID-19 pandemic are unjust and to 
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work out what changes and processes might be required to 
justly respond to these inequalities. 
The first sub-question asks: What inequalities has the 
COVID-19 pandemic reinforced and produced in the 
Philippines? This means that I will start with looking at the 
impacts and resultant complex inequalities of the 
Philippines’ COVID-19 response and then construct a 
relational egalitarian framework, drawing from the works of 
various relational egalitarians, to identify and understand 
them more clearly. I will also examine which social relations 
and institutional arrangements have caused or contributed to 
the inequalities of COVID-19. To a certain extent, I have 
already begun to answer this first sub-question as I have 
already identified specific inequalities associated with the 
pandemic. There is still more, however, to be said about 
these inequalities, especially since they have been discussed 
here only in relation to a few examples of the impacts of the 
Philippines’ COVID-19 response. There is also more to be 
said about relational egalitarianism as a theory. 
The second sub-question asks: From the relational 
egalitarian perspective, which of these inequalities are 
unjust? This means that after answering the first sub-
question, I will sift through the COVID-19 inequalities I 
have identified—namely, the unequal distribution of medical 
resources, the unequal impacts of quarantine measures, and 
the unequal enforcement of quarantine restrictions—and 
then using the relational egalitarian framework I have 
constructed, I will figure out which among them are unjust. 




Answering this second sub-question means taking a closer 
look at the social relations and institutional arrangements that 
are causally relevant to these unjust inequalities and checking 
if they disempower, disrespect, or disadvantage people. 
Answering this sub-question will also allow us to take stock 
of our intuitions about injustice and check which of them 
may need to be refined or even replaced. 
Finally, the third sub-question asks: What structural 
changes would relational egalitarianism require in 
responding to these injustices? This means that I will also 
work out, using my relational egalitarian framework, how 
to reduce or eliminate the injustices associated with 
COVID-19. More precisely, I will review causally relevant 
social relations and institutional arrangements to figure out 
what structural changes and processes might be required to 
justly respond to the injustices that these relations or 
arrangements have caused and identify who might be 
responsible for implementing and developing such structural 
changes and processes. Based on the answer to this sub-
question, I will also attempt to sketch out a working 
relational egalitarian approach to pursuing justice in extreme 
health crises such as pandemics. 
All in all, then, I will argue that the distributive 
inequalities of the COVID-19 pandemic are rooted in 
relational inequalities embodied by social hierarchies of 
power, esteem, and standing. As such the inequalities of 
COVID-19 call for an understanding of and a response to 




the pandemic not only in terms of public health and 
economics but also in terms of social justice. In line with 
this argument, I aim to construct a relational egalitarian 
framework to systematically identify, examine, and respond 
to the injustices that arise from pandemics and other 
extreme health crises, as well as contribute to a more refined 
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